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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(h)(Michie 1996), the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to hear "...appeals from District Court involving domestic relations cases, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity." 
STATEMENT OF TJ8E ISSVES ANP STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Did the trial court commit reversible error by granting alimony without 
predicating that award with specific findings as to the three pronged Jonesl test required by the 
Supreme Court of Utah? 
Standard of Review : The trial court's applications of law and legal conclusions regarding 
alimony are reviewed for correctness. Bell v Bell 810 P.2d 489 (Utah Ct App 1991). 
IgSUE n : Did the trial court commit clear error in making a finding of fact that the 
Appellee had an income of zero for alimony computation? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, Elmer 
v Elmer. 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), see also Rothe v Rothe. 787 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
ISSUE III: Did the trial court commit clear error in making a finding of fact as to the 
amount of Appellant's net income for alimony computation? 
Standard of Review : The trial court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error, Elmer 
v Elmer. 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989) see also RothevRothe. 787 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
1
 Jones v Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
M^ature of Proceedings :This action below was a divorce proceeding filed by the Appellee / 
Plaintiff hereinafter "Appellee" The stated grounds for the divorce were irreconcilable 
differences with the Appellant/Defendant, hereinafter Appellant. The Appellee moved for child 
support, alimony, custody of the minor children. 
Course of the Proceedings : The Appellee was granted various temporary orders as to 
custody, alimony, child support and visitation at an order to show cause hearing held on July 26, 
1996. R. 22,25. After once being postponed, the matter was set for trial on April 28,1997. 
Counsel for the defendant moved for a continuance prior to trial by motion, and once again 
renewed this motion at trial which was denied. At this point Appellant dismissed his counsel of 
record and moved for a continuance to retain other counsel, again this motion was denied. 
Trial proceeded and Appellee presented two witnesses Antonella Turnow, Appellee, and 
Toni Hughes a child therapist. Appellant presented two witnesses; Leo Turnow, Appellant and 
James Tornow, son to a previous marriage of Appellant. The direct testimony of the witnesses 
for the Appellee was largely composed of evidence that could not have withstood proper 
objections on evidentiary grounds. However, the Appellant proceeding pro se was unadvised and 
had insuflBcient legal knowledge to properly object in each and every notice of improperly entered 
evidence. Appellant did, however, make statements re: the issues raised in this appeal that would 
signify bringing a pro se parties objection to the trial court's attention. 
Disposition of the Trial Court :The trial court ruled from the bench at the close of 
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evidence awarding custody to Appellee with an order for Toni Hughes to draft a visitation plan. 
The trial court ordered alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars a month and child support 
in the amount of one thousand four hundred and seven dollars a month be paid by Appellant. The 
trial court made various other orders not issue here. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellee testified during direct that she had been supplementing her income by 
substituting as a teacher R. 340,342. Counsel for Appellee admitted to purposefully 
withholding information concerning the true value of Appellee's income. R. 460. Counsel for 
Appellee admitted as PlaintifiTs Exhibit 3 financial worksheets that declared this monthly income 
of Appellee to be zero. R. 460,132 Pl.f's] Ex. 3. Counsel for Appellee admitted as PlaintifiTs 
Exhibit 4 a child support obligation worksheet that again states Appellee's income at zero. R. 
460,132Pl.['s]Ex.4. 
Appellant testified as to his gross income being $4,833. R. 516. Appellant twice raised 
the issue of the effect of being in a higher tax bracket, R. 516, 558. 
With respect to Appellee's request for alimony and her present and future ability to earn, 
the trial court found (1) that Appellee currently worked part-time. R. 559; (2) that Appellee had 
a high school diploma and some college education short of a degree. R. 558; (3) that Appellee 
wants to be a teacher. R. 559; (4) that the training to become a teacher would take five years. R. 
559. The court then ordered alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars for five years. R. 
565. 
With respect to Appellant's income and ability to provide requested alimony the trial court 
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found (1) Appellant's gross monthly income to be $ 4,833. R. 559; (2) that Appellant's net 
income be set at $ 3,624 based upon the trial court's own appraisal of roughly what amount of 
taxes would be withheld. R. 565. 
ISSUE NUMBER I; SUMMARY 
Appellant is entitled to have award of alimony set aside as a matter of law. The Utah 
Supreme Court has set out three specific factors that must be considered when the trial court is 
set upon fashioning an award of alimony.2 In the instant case the trial court (1) failed to make any 
manner of findings as to the financial needs of the Appellee; (2) made a finding wholly opposed to 
the evidence at trial as to the current ability of Appellee to earn; (3) lacking the proper evidence 
as to deductions from Appellant's gross pay, the court arbitrarily devalued Appellant's monthly 
income to the net figure used in figuring his ability to provide requested alimony.3 The trial 
court's negligent handling of the facts and unsubstantiated findings of facts invalidate the award of 
alimony. Based upon the foregoing the Appellant is entitled to relief against the unsubstantiated 
grant of alimony. 
2Jones v Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985. 
3
 This type of random manipulation of the numbers without some foundation by way of 
evidence is exactly the type conduct this Court warned against in Willeyv. WilleyT 914 P.2d 1149 
(UtahCtApp. 1996). 
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ISSUE NUMBER I; ARGUMENT 
In general an award of alimony is used to "equalize the parties respective standards of 
living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to that...enjoyed during the marriage," 
Gardner v Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, at 1081 (Utah 1988). The grant of alimony to a spouse is 
also used to "prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge." English v. English. 565 P.2d 
409, at 411 (Utah 1977). When one of the parties is seeking an award of alimony the trial court 
must weigh a variety of factors in deciding if it is warranted in that particular case. 
The Supreme Court of Utah has set out the following three factors that must be 
considered when the trial court is called upon to determine if alimony should be awarded : 
"three factors.. .must be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony 
award. [1] the financial conditions and needs of the [spouse seeking 
support];[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking support] to produce 
a sufficient income for [himself or] herself, and [3] the ability of the 
[payor spouse] to provide support," Jones at 1075. 
In Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App.1991), this Court reviewed a case very similar to 
the instant case where an award of alimony was chaUenged on the grounds that the trial court had 
not made suflBcient findings as to the lones factors. This Court entered a holding that "[fjailure to 
consider the Jones factors in fashioning an alimony award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Bell 
at 492. Additionally, in Bfill the factual findings of the trial court were challenged as insufficient 
to support the award of alimony. In evaluating the specificity of the factual findings of the trial 
court this Court stated that: 
"the trial court must make sufficiently detailed findings on each 
factor to enable a reviewing court to ensure that the Trial Court's 
discretionary determination was rationally based upon the three 
Jones factors." Efifl at 492. 
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This standard has been repeatedly upheld where the trial court has been delinquent either 
in making the necessary findings, or when the findings themselves are lacking in specificity.4 
The prevailing law cited above must now be applied to the facts of the instant case and the 
disputed findings of fact issued by the trial court and how they relate to the lones4 factors. 
It is difficult to bifurcate the findings made by the trial court as to the first and second 
prong of the Jones test as the trial court did not set out specifically set out a finding as to either 
prong. The findings themselves manifest in what appears to be a casual synopsis of what was 
purported at trial by way of testimony. The findings contain very little if any analysis as to weight 
given to testimony, or how testimony was utilized in evaluating the respective claims of the 
parties. Exacerbating the already difficult analysis is the degree to which certain evidence may be 
generally relevant as to both current need of spouse and future ability of spouse to earn. Because 
of the above described difficulties Appellant will discuss analysis of prong one and two together. 
The trial court made the finding that "for the purposes of child support and alimony, that 
the plaintiff works part-time as a substitute teacher." R. 558. The trial court further found that 
"there was no testimony as to plaintiffs part-time income, that she's been primarily in the home 
raising children." R. 559. Additional trial court findings are that Appellee has "education, 
graduated the...equivalent of high school... some college, but no formal degree." R. 558. The 
trial court found that Appellee had a "desire to be a teacher." R. 559. The trial court made a 
findings that it would take ".. .five years to complete the training..." R. 559. The foregoing 
4
 See generally MUMIS V. Munns, 790 P.2d 116 (Utah a . App. 1990); Noble v Noble. 
761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988); Willevv Willev. 866 P.2d 547 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Bell v Bell. 
810 P.2d 489(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Stevens v Stevens. 754 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Eafei 
xJEafel 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986); Davis vDavjs. 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988); Asperv Asperr 
753 P.2d 978 (Utah a . App. 1988). 
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represents a marshaling of all the findings pertaining to both [1] need of the spouse requesting 
alimony and [2] ability of spouse requesting alimony to provide sufficient independent income. 
The trial court has made passing notice of the evidence presented at trial, but makes 
absolutely no attempt to cohesively apply the facts at hand to the standard imposed by Jones. 
Although the trial court made a finding as to Appellee being employed part-time the trial court 
ignored its own finding and valued her income at zero for the purposes of computing alimony and 
child support. Absolutely no evidence of any kind was elicited at trial that she received no income 
from her part-time work. In fact the only evidence was that she was indeed receiving monies.5 
The trial court appears to have erroneously relied upon the reassurances of Mr. Peterson, counsel 
for Appellee, when Mr. Peterson informed the Court that he had purposefully decided not to 
include the information regarding her income based on his experience that it would be of no 
consequence. R. 460. 
Despite contentions of Appellee's counsel about having an accurate assessment of the 
income of the spouse seeking an award of alimony, this Court has stated that: 
**the court must make realistic assessments of actual current income 
and actual expenses...[a]bsent such an assessment and appropriate 
findings, there is no basis on which to determine the proper amount 
and duration of alimony to achieve a rehabilitative outcome." 
Xfiltey866P.2dat554. 
The third prong of the IQQSS factors relates to the ability of the spouse not seeking support 
to provide for an award of alimony. The trial court made a findings that the Appellant's gross 
salary was $4,833.00. R. 559. In figuring the net amount of $ 3,624.00, the trial court took an 
5
 A complete presentation of the evidence in this matter is marshaled in the body of Issue 
n. 
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arbitrary "25 percent of that for FICA and taxes. Fm going to leave the other expenses, but just 
FICA and taxes represent roughly about 25 percent" R. 565. This rounding down of the gross 
pay is done completely sua sponte and absolutely no evidence of any kind was presented as to 
what amounts are being currently deducted from the Appellant's gross pay. The trial court then 
finds that based upon this arbitrary number that "would leave about an $ 800.00 difference of 
[Appellant's] net income and necessary expenses." R. 565. These represent all of the findings 
and orders made in regards to the third prong of the Jones factors. Once again the Trial Court 
has completely failed to craft a discernible finding of fact in regards to the ability of the spouse not 
seeking alimony to provide sought after support. The instant facts surrounding the trial court's 
lack of consideration of the lanes factors are similar to the deficiencies. The supreme court noted 
when arriving at the holding in Jones where it stated: 
'"Nowhere in the trial court's memorandum decision, it findings of 
fact, or its statements made on the record at the conclusion of the 
hearing is there any indication that the court analyzed the 
circumstances of the parties in light of these three factors." 
Cowctosion and Statement for Relief 
The facts in this case clearly warrant that this case be remanded to the trial court to make 
findings in accordance with well established Utah law. The trial court has failed to even cursorily 
address the requirements of Jones and in so doing has undermined the question of the 
reasonableness of the award of alimony. Accordingly the Appellant would pray for the following 
relief: 
1. That the order by the trial court directing that the Appellant be ordered to pay alimony 
be vacated. 
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2. That a hearing b e held in which either party may present evidence as t o the underlying 
Appel lee t o provide for herself, the amount o f Appel lee ' s part-time work, c u m i I rli di :l 
from the Appellant's paychecks and any other evidence the trial cc in: t • it m is i e I z • ant. 
i That the trial court be instructed to fashion specific findings as to the tin ee factoi s 
required in Jones, and to craft those findings upon admissible evidence presented at the hearing to 
be held pursuant t \ > 11 Htn I i i in in il s dn 11 il in 
I That i f the n e w findings indicate an appreciable difference between what is currently 
ordered for child support and w o u l d b e ordered if the n e w numbers were used th en the ti lal ;:> z \ II I: 
b e g iven the discretion t o amend the previous order as t o future child support pa> ments i egai ding 
the amounts. 
ISSUE NUMBER U; SUMMARY 
The trial court committed clear error w h e n Ii I UMI iliiiiliiiji, iLii ilir A^icllci I i I 
an income o f zero for the purposes o f computing alimony I  III! i vicJencT elicited at trial, mostly 
on direct by the Appel lee herself, can clearly support only a finding that Appel lee indeed w a s 
receiving . - monthly income The trial court disregarded all available evidence and 
instead reached a holding whol ly at o d d s with the record in this case. Accordingly, the Appellant 
make findings consistent with current actual income o f the Appel lee 
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ISSUE NTOBER H; ARGUMENT 
The trial court is granted considerable discretion to make findings of fact based upon 
evidence at trial. In reviewing findings made during trial, the Supreme Court has stated that it will 
"favor the findings, judgements and decrees of the trial court, particularly in divorce matters." 
Watson v Watson. 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977) at 1073. Utah statute and this Court promote the 
fact that the trial court is in the best position to assess weight to evidence and has the chance to 
make first hand impressions of the witnesses and testimony, see generally Utah R. Civ. P 
52(a)(Supp. 1996), and Marchaffl V, Marchant, 743 P,2d 199, at 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . 
Notwithstanding this, the right of review on appeal has its purposes. Utah Constitution Article 
VIII Section 5 guarantees "an appeal of right.. to a court with appellate jurisdiction." To this 
end the Supreme Court has stated that it would be "remiss in its responsibility ...if it 
unquestioningly accepted all actions of the trial court." Watson at 1073. The court of appeals has 
held that ic[a] finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great weight of the evidence or if we 
are otherwise definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made." Hardy vr Hardy, 776 
P.2d 917, at 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
With this standard in view Appellant will now marshal the evidence that was presented at 
trial in regards to the income of the Appellee. 
The Appellee testified during her direct testimony that "I've been substituting on the—on 
the Davis School District." R. 340. When Appellee was asked on direct if " y ° u r e &le to 
supplement [your child support and alimony payments] to some degree with your part-time 
work?" R. 342. The Appellee stated "Yes." R. 343. 
Counsel for the Appellee entered into evidence two separate documents concerning the 
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financial situation of the Appellee. Appellee valued her monthly income at zero in her financial 
support worksheets once again her monthly income was valued at zero R 132 P l . f s ] Ex. 4. 
Although the next excerpt from the trial does not wholly qualify as di it • t • :: t s i : I i ' nice, it w as 
a comment by counsel in response to a question by the trial court, A €11IV U 1 V 1 U U W O 11 t * 0 AUX HAW* 
indicia that indeed the Appellee was receiving income. Upon the trial court's question regarding 
not include it, your honor lie 2 : a as 3 .it is minimal and my experien :: sha st 1 t nthat h wi] • : ; 1 11 
talking about these low numbers, if you get the higher income with a 1c < 1 spousal income. that th c • 
ratio ends up about the same, so I—we—we felt it was of no consequence. !l" .1 460. Despite the 
brevity of the foregoing section it represents a comprehensive review of the evidefi c 1 • l i t 2 a • ::i it trial 
r-*""'s« - *"• * Appellee 
Based upon this te ie a findings that 'Tor the purposes of child 
the trial court found that **there was no testimony as to plaintiffs part-time income, that she's 
been primarily in the home raising children,.' " ' R 559. By lookii " ; • • •  ! • • 1;< lony and 
child support. The trial court subsequently used 1 111: ing child 
support and alimony. 
In light c: f th 2 complete lack of evidence in H>MII1'I ill Ihcse findings, the duty of this Court 
to set aside these unsubstantiated findings is clear. Accordingly the Appellant would ask for the 
folio ingi elii: rf: 
Statement for Rgiifef 
1. That the trial court's finding of zero value for the Appellee's monthly income be 
vacated. 
2. That the trial court be instructed to hold a hearing at which time both parties be allowed 
to present evidence as to the income of the Appellee. 
3. That the trial court be instructed to make findings consistent with a realistic assessment 
of the actual and real income of the Appellee. 
4. That the trial court utilize the corrected figures for income when computing the various 
orders necessary for post-decree support. 
ISSUE NUMgER m; SUMMARY 
The trial court committed clear error when it made findings as to Appellant's net income 
for the purposes of computing alimony and child support. The only evidence presented at trial 
was to the Appellant's gross income. The trial court then arbitrarily devalued the gross amount to 
arrive at a net figure for computational purposes. This manner of random, foundationless and 
unsolicited manipulation of the numbers is at odds with foundation of the judiciary system. 
Accordingly, the Appellant is entitled to have the findings as to Appellant's net income vacated 
and remanded for the trial court to make findings consistent with this Court's holdings. 
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ISSUE NVMPER m ; ARGUMENT 
court's findings of fact. In an effort to limit unnecessary .vu, Appellant will defer to and 
incorporate the first paragraph of the argument portion of Issue II, located at page 10 of this brief, 
There is very little direct evidence to marshal i s made by the 
trial court to arri\ e at the n et figui e.' I h t App himseii ^ i ™ * :>eing 
$ 4,833.00. *v. - ^ . The limited testimony regarding deductions from that gross amount again 
came from the Appellant where he expressed concerns that: "I am. now a single pe i: son, I'm going 
to 
be in the highest tax bracket. There is also a loan from the retirement account" R. 516. Further 
518. 
and taxes. I'm going to leave the other expenses, but just FICA and taxes represent i oughl) about 
25 percent" 1 565 This rounding down of the gross pay is done completely sua sponte and 
absolutely no evidence of any kind was presented as to what amounts are being currently 
deducted from the Appellant's gross pay. The lack of detail by the trial court in preserving its 
Marchflpt. this Court stated that findings of feet must be "sufficiently detailed and include enough 
reached." Maichant at 202 citing to Acton V Peliim 737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987). The I i Ial COM t 
P a g e J ."! ," J I \ < 
making this sort of unsubstantiated adjustments to the numbers when computing income for the 
worksheets has been chagrined by this Court previously. In Willey v Willey. 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996), the trial court sua sponte reduced the stipulated expenses of the parties without 
any evidence by either of the parties. When making the reductions the trial court neglected to 
affirmatively state for the record upon what basis the reductions were made In evaluating the 
appropriateness of those reductions this Court stated that: 
"ft]he sheer absence of any evidence upon which to base the factual 
findings regarding these adjustments makes them unacceptable. To 
allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory 
process violates the basic premise upon which our judicial system is 
founded." Willey 914 P.2d at 1152. 
The facts concerning the reductions made in Willey^ and the court's method of arriving at 
a net figure in this case are similarly random in nature. In both Wiltey and the instant case, the 
disputed adjustments were unsubstantiated either by the record, or clearly supported by findings 
sufficient to enable this Court to properly exercise appellate review. The findings in this case are 
so vague that no insight can as to the trial court's reasoning can be deduced. Accordingly 
Appellant moves for the following relief. 
Statement of Retief 
1. That the trial court's findings as to the net income of the Appellant be vacated. 
2. That a hearing be held and at that time both parties be able to submit evidence and 
information regarding the proper deduction to made from the gross pay of the 
Appellant. 
3. That the trial court be instructed to make new findings of facts in regards to the 
amount of net pay for the Appellant. 
4. That any awards of spousal support be computed utilizing the corrected figures. 
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Respectfully submitted this day of November, 1997. 
7rances M. Palacios 
Attorney for Appellant 
F~ 
I 1 ,K III' M A l t OF MAILING***** 
This is to certify that on the 17* day of November, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was mailed first 
class postage pre-paid to the following: Sennet P. Peterson, 
Attorney for Appellee, 74 East 500 South, Suite 205, Bountiful, 
Utah 84010; the Honorable Jon M. Memmot, 800 West State 
Street, Farmington, Utah 84025. 
francesm Palacios 
Attorney for Appellant 
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